˲
systems would not work due to the lack of the "social processes" that drive confidence in mathematical proofs. Even today, there are no human proofs of real systems; and That formally specifying real sys-˲ tems would continue to be impossibly difficult, a position since vindicated by history. Where are the formal specifications for Windows 7, thousands of iPhone apps downloaded daily, and hundreds of thousands of other systems used every day in research, commerce, and government? They do not exist. Publication of "Social Processes and Proofs of Theorems and Programs" was not a singular event. It was refereed. A preliminary version was accepted by a highly selective conference program committee in 1976-predating by more than a year the article by Amir Pnueli that Vardi criticized us for not citingand its presentation was attended by virtually every living contributor to the field. It was then submitted to Communications and reviewed by anonymous referees. Its publication was followed by months of public presentations and workshops, letters to the editor, written reinforcements and rebuttals, andyears later-a special issue of Communications devoted to the topic.
The article was widely read and commented on by computer scientists, engineers, and mathematicians but, rather than spark debate in the formal verification community, provoked only stony silence. A quick scan of the formal verification literature in the years 1979-1990 reveals virtually no citations to the article. In what sense is an article "controversial" if one side refuses to engage in discussion? Indeed, email circulating among the principals in the field aimed to tamp down debate and ignore our argument that many outside the field still consider substantial and prescient.
The field of formal program verification has changed substantially since 1979. Its goals have become more modest and its claims less sweeping. New methods have emerged. An equally compelling reading of history suggests that, during the long silence, the formal verification research community realized it had been misguided in 1979 and used the arguments-without attribution-set forth in the article as a roadmap to reorient its agenda.
The article itself has been reprinted dozens of times, as well as in several anthologies in the philosophy of mathematics. Donald MacKenzie's book Mechanizing Proof: Computing, Risk, and Trust (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001 ) remains the definitive sociological and historical analysis of both the article and its implications for the field. If, to Vardi, our arguments seem off the mark, then perhaps the right course is to resurrect the social process that led to the article's publication in the first place and jump into the fray. Until that time, the correct editorial position for Communications and its Editor-inChief is to let both the article (and the written record that surrounds it) speak for itself.
It is inappropriate, after 30 years of silence, to use the cover of an editorship to attack unsuspecting passersby, especially while touting the moral virtues of free and vigorous debate. Such a mechanism could be viewed as advanced and not easily digested by the intended users of the Scratch programming language. But some projects on the Scratch Web site feature significant code redundancy and could be reduced in size and simplified if the code could be restructured through a few suitable functions.
Though not all Scratch programmers would be comfortable with an abstraction mechanism, it seems a pity that something so fundamental does not even exist, and so cannot be conveniently demonstrated and disseminated.
Second in importance and also missing from the Scratch programming language is a data-structuring mechanism.
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